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LET’S WORK TOGETHER! ECONOMIC COOPERATION,
SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND CHANCES OF SOCIAL MOBILITY
IN CLASSICAL ATHENS
I
In the early fourth century BC, a slave of possibly Phoenician origin,
called Pasion, was owned by the Athenian bankers Antisthenes and
Archestratos (Dem. 36.43). During the course of his slavery, Pasion
quickly rose to become the trusted manager of his owners’ money-
changing and banking ﬁrm in Piraeus. After having been manumitted
(Dem. 36.48), he took over the running of this bank (Isocr. 17, passim),
became a very successful banker, and established a shield factory. His
businesses prospered to the extent that by the time of his death in
370/369 he had assembled a fortune estimated at around 70 talents.1
With this money, Pasion made a number of generous benefactions to
the Athenians, as a reward for which the Athenians passed a decree
in his favour granting him a gold crown and the right of citizenship
to him and his descendants ([Dem.] 59.2).2 As soon as he received
his grant of citizenship, Pasion started to make use of his citizen rights
and invested in real property. Although he was probably never actively
involved in politics, he is known to have been a close friend of several
members of the political elite, such as Agyrrhius of Collyte (Isocr.
17.31) and Callistratus of Aphnida (Dem. 49.47). Moreover, he had
dealings with important public ﬁgures, such as Timotheus, son of
Conon (Dem. 49, passim).
In short, the tale of Pasion is one of increasing riches and success.
Not only did he, initially a humble slave, considerably improve his eco-
nomic, legal, and social status within Athenian society during his own
lifetime. He also managed to be freed from slavery and to receive the
honour of being an Athenian citizen, which was extraordinary for a
1 J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, 600–300 B.C. (Oxford, 1971), 428–9; J. Trevett,
Apollodoros, the Son of Pasion (Oxford, 1992), 1–2.
2 M. J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens (Brussels, 1981–3), ii.47–9. For dissimilar views on
the date of Pasion’s naturalization, see K. A. Kapparis, Apollodoros ‘Against Neaira’ [D. 59].
Edited with Introduction, Translation and Commentary (Berlin, 1999), 169.
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foreigner – let alone for a former slave.3 But to what extent does
Pasion’s life story tell us something about social mobility as a signiﬁcant
phenomenon in classical Athens?4 Traditionally, social mobility has
been considered a characteristic feature of modern meritocratic soci-
eties, whereas pre-industrial societies have been categorized as static,
hierarchical, and rigid. This opinion – clearly a legacy of eighteenth-,
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century economists and sociologists
such as Smith, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim – has during the last
few decades been challenged by ancient, medieval, and early modern
historians, who, drawing on historical data from a wide variety of
sources, have been able to cast doubt on the presumption of relatively
little mobility in pre-industrial societies.5
However, while extensive studies of social mobility exist for Rome,6
only restricted aspects of social mobility in ancient Athens have been
3 As noted by D. Whitehead, The Ideology of the Athenian Metic (Cambridge, 1977), 114–16,
freedmen were, although of identical legal status to other metics, generally regarded as a distinct
group. For naturalization in classical Athens, see Osborne (n. 2); M. Deene, ‘Naturalized Citizens
and Social Mobility in Classical Athens: the Case of Apollodorus’, G&R 58.2 (2011), 159–75.
4 As recognized by the German sociologist H. Kaelble, Historical Research on Social Mobility.
Western Europe and the USA in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London, 1977), 113, ‘social
mobility’ is a vague concept, which for the beneﬁt of historical research requires not only a precise
deﬁnition but also precise contours. In this article, the term ‘social mobility’ is interpreted as being
‘the movement in time of social units between different positions in the system of social stratiﬁca-
tion of a society’. As social stratiﬁcation can be conceived of in many dimensions, social mobility is
thus a multifaceted concept, which should be studied as such. For the deﬁnition, see W. Müller,
‘Mobility, Social’, in N. J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social
& Behavioral Sciences (Amsterdam, 2001), 9918.
5 Social mobility as a subject of historical research became important in the ‘golden age’ of the
so-called new social history in the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, scholars were above all seeking to
study the history of equality of social opportunities, by discussing the history of social mobility in a
comparative view. Major contributions in this ﬁeld were brought forward not only by sociologists
and political scientists but also by historians. Past & Present (1966), the Journal of Interdisciplinary
History (1976), and Historical Methods (1998) dedicated special issues to social structures and
social mobility in past societies, while the Journal of Economic History published numerous articles
in the 1970s and early 1980s on social structures, inequalities, and mobility.
6 See K. Hopkins, ‘Social Mobility in the Later Roman Empire: The Evidence of Ausonius’,
CQ 11 (1961), 234–49; K. Hopkins, ‘Eunuchs in Politics in the Later Roman Empire’, PCPhS
9 (1963), 62–80; K. Hopkins, ‘Elite Mobility in the Roman Empire’, P&P 32 (1965), 12–26;
K. Hopkins, Death and Renewal (Cambridge, 1983); R. MacMullen, ‘Social Mobility in the
Theodosian Code’, JRS 54 (1964), 49–53; P. Weaver, ‘Social Mobility in the Early Roman
Empire: The Evidence of the Imperial Freedmen and Slaves’, P&P 37 (1967), 3–20; B.
Dobson, ‘The Centurionate and Social Mobility During the Principate’, in C. Nicolet (ed.),
Recherches sur les structures socials dans l’antiquité classique (Paris, 1970), 99–116; H. Pleket,
‘Sociale stratiﬁcatie en sociale mobiliteit in de Romeinse keizertijd’, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis
84 (1971), 215–51; T. P. Wiseman, New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C.–A.D. 14 (London,
1971); P. A. Brunt, ‘Nobilitas and novitas’, JRS 72 (1982), 1–17; N. Purcell, ‘The Apparitores:
A Study in Social Mobility’, PBSR 51 (1983), 125–73; E. Frézouls, La Mobilité sociale dans le
monde romain (Strasbourg, 1992); R. Saller, Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family
(Cambridge, 1994); W. Waldstein, review of J. M. Serrano Delgado, Status y promoción social de
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considered, and then mostly incidentally.7 Thus, despite the obvious
importance of this topic for our understanding of classical Athenian
society, we still lack a speciﬁc study of Athenian social mobility. This
can be explained by the fact that, for a long time, the different major
schools of thought in Greek social and economic history were united
in their belief that Athenian society was essentially static and rigid.
Remarkable indications of social mobility and attestations of indivi-
duals undergoing dramatic changes of socio-economic status, such as
Pasion, have generally been dismissed as exceptions. Many Athenian
scholars have clearly taken the elitist and moralist Athenian texts,
which plainly testify to the lack of an ideology emphasizing the possibil-
ity and merit of mobility (so important in modern, Western capitalist
society), at face value.8
One of the most important reasons for minimizing non-citizens’
chances of social mobility in classical Athens was the standard belief
that Athenian society was characterized by a rigid demarcation line
los libertos en Hispania Romana (The Status and Social Advancement of Freedmen in Roman Spain),
Gnomon 65.3 (1993), 276–8; K. Rosen, ‘Roman Freedmen as Social Climbers, and Petronius
“Cena Tremalchionis”’, Gymnasium 102.1 (1995), 79–92; P. L. Barja de Quiroga, ‘Freedmen
Social Mobility in Roman Italy’, Historia 44.3 (1995), 326–4; L. E. Tacoma, Fragile Hierarchies.
The Urban Elites of Third-century Roman Egypt (Leiden, 2006); J. S. Richardson, ‘Social
Mobility in the Hispanic Provinces in the Republican Period’, in L. de Blois (ed.),
Administration, Prosopography and Appointment Policies in the Roman empire (Amsterdam, 2001),
246–54; J. Patterson, ‘Social Mobility and the Cities of Italy’, in Landscapes and Cities. Rural
Settlement and Civic Transformation in Early Imperial Italy (Oxford, 2006), 184–264; N. Tran,
‘Les affranchis dans les collèges professionnels de l’Italie du Haut-Empire: l’encadrement civique
de la mobilité sociale’, in M. Molin (ed.), Les Régulations sociales dans l’Antiquité (Rennes, 2006),
389–402; A. E. Jones, Social Mobility in Late Antique Gaul. Strategies and Opportunities for the
Non-elite (Cambridge and New York, 2009).
7 Such as in Davies’ study of wealth and social position (J. K. Davies, Wealth and the Power of
Wealth in Classical Athens [New York, 1981]) and in Millett’s work on lending and borrowing (P.
Millett, Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens [Cambridge, 1991]), which among other things
addresses the impoverishment and decline of privileged Athenian families. N. R. E. Fisher,
‘Greek Associations, Symposia, and Clubs’, in M. Grant and R. Kitzinger (eds.), Civilization of
the Ancient Mediterranean. Greece and Rome (New York, 1988), ii.1167–97; N. Fisher,
‘Symposiasts, Fish-eaters and Flatterers: Social Mobility and Moral Concerns in Old Comedy’,
in D. Harvey and J. Wilkins (eds.), The Rivals of Aristophanes (London, 2000), 372–3; and
Deene (n. 3) are notable exceptions.
8 Thus, in [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 2.18, the so-called Old Oligarch reports how Attic comedy attacks
not only well-born Athenians but also common citizens seeking to rise above their standing.
Similarly, Aristotle describes how men tend not to be made indignant and envious by attainable
virtues, such as courage and justices, but rather by attributes which they cannot hope to acquire,
especially wealth and power (Rhet. 1387a6–15). Eur. Suppl. 176 and Thuc. 2.40.1 are notable
exceptions, stating it to be wise or honourable to seek economic advancement through honest,
hard work.
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between its various legal status groups. Characteristic is Raaﬂaub’s
assertion that
the success of the democracy in securing the loyalty and devotion of the vast majority of
citizens rested largely on its insistence on a marked distinction between citizens (what-
ever their social status) on the one hand, and all categories of non-citizens on the other
hand.9
In the same way, Todd deﬁned the three legal status groups in Athenian
society as ‘sharply distinguished not simply as concepts but in actual-
ity’.10 A reality like this would indeed have had profound repercussions
for those non-citizens attempting to improve their social status in
Athenian society.11 Since the early post-Second World War period,
research on social mobility has largely turned to the study of social
opportunity, speciﬁcally to the extent to which in certain societies indi-
viduals and groups have different chances of movement between posi-
tions of unequal advantage, providing their holders with unequal
power, material or symbolic assets, and privilege. This concern had
its roots in the prevalent interest in the degree of ‘openness’ – a concept
denoting the relative ﬂuidity or rigidity of a stratiﬁcation system – and
from curiosity about the individual, institutional, and societal factors
responsible for it.12 Much attention has been paid to potential oppor-
tunities for creating social networks, through which the acquisition of
resources for social mobility is facilitated. In a seminal article from
1973, the sociologist Granovetter convincingly ascertained a division
between weak-tie-linked and strong-tie-linked networks of social rela-
tionships, arguing that weak ties promote ‘bridging’ across those net-
works that commonly operate as small and closed cliques, and have a
special role in a person’s opportunity for social mobility, as long as
9 K. Raaﬂaub, ‘Democracy, Oligarchy and the Concept of the “Free Citizen” in Late
Fifth-century Athens’, Political Theory 11 (1983), 532.
10 S. C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford, 1993) 173. See also K. Raaﬂaub, ‘Des
freien Bürgers Recht der freien Red: ein Beitrag zur Begriffs- und Sozialgeschichte der athenischen
Demokratie’, in W. Eck, H. Galsterer, and H. Wolff (eds.), Studien zur Antiken Sozialgeschichte.
Festschrift Friedrich Vittinghoff (Cologne and Vienna, 1980), 44–6; C. Meier, Introduction à l’anthro-
pologie politique de l’antiquité classique (Paris, 1984), 20–2; S. B. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives,
and Slaves. Women in Classical Antiquity (New York, 1975), 78.
11 Just as social mobility is referred to in this article as a multifaceted concept, so the concept of
social status should be interpreted as the position which one holds in a given society and which can
be inﬂuenced by birth, wealth, honoriﬁc assets, legal status, social standing or connections, etc.
Contrary to how the concept has been used in V. J. Hunter and J. C. Edmondson, Law and
Social Status in Classical Athens (Oxford, 2000), it should not be equated with legal status.
12 Müller (n. 4), 9918–24.
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they connect him or her to high-status individuals, by exposing him or
her to opportunities beyond his or her immediate social status group.
The use of strong ties, associating family members and close friends
within a condensed network, however, restricts the chances of social
mobility. Since the members of these social networks are likely to pos-
sess the same amount and types of advantages, there is limited oppor-
tunity for the kinds of social interaction that could potentially lead to
upward social mobility.13
If indeed Athenian society was characterized by a rigid demarcation
line between citizens and non-citizens, this would, using Granovetter’s
model as a framework for analysis, imply that non-citizens’ network
opportunities were restricted to strong ties among themselves, without
access to more heterogeneous forms of social capital (that is, ‘bridging
capital’ as opposed to ‘bonding capital’),14 which would be able to cre-
ate ‘bridges’ across legal status. However, the notion that non-citizens
were socially isolated from Athenian citizenry, with few connections to
social resources facilitating mobility, is clearly wrong.
Recent attempts have been made to demonstrate that Athenian
society was far more complex and multifaceted than the prevailing tri-
partite oversimpliﬁcation.15 The most devastating attack on the trad-
itional view has been offered by Cohen in The Athenian Nation.16
However, by focusing on arguably untypical and non-representative
examples, such as slave entrepreneurs living separately from their mas-
ters, and wealthy prostitutes, Cohen’s attack on the traditional view of
Athenian society has not attracted broad support from the academic
13 M. Granovetter, ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’, American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973), 1360–
80.
14 From Granovetter’s basic distinction, R. D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival
of American Community (New York and London, 2000), identiﬁed two kinds of social capital:
bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital refers to relations between homogen-
ous groups, bringing the possibility for negative consequences, most prominent among which is
the exclusion of outsiders. Bridging social capital, which is most likely to create social inclusion,
refers to relations between people differing on crucial personal characteristics, such as ethnicity,
socio-economic status, or – when referring to classical Antiquity – legal status.
15 See, for example, E. E. Cohen, Athenian Economy and Society. A Banking Perspective
(Princeton, NJ, 1992); V. J. Hunter, Policing Athens. Social Control in Attic Lawsuits (Princeton,
NJ, 1994); B. Bäbler, Fleissige Thrakerinnen und wehrhafte Skythen. Nichtgriechen im klassischen
Athen und ihre archäologische Hinterlassenschaft (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1998); M. Adak, Metöken
als Wohltäter Athens. Untersuchungen zum sozialen Austausch zwischen ortsansässigen Fremden und
der Burgergemeinde in klassischer un hellenistischer Zeit, ca. 500–150 v. Chr. (Munich, 2003); K.
Vlassopoulos, ‘Free Spaces: Identity, Experience and Democracy in Classical Athens’, CQ 57.1
(2007), 33–52.
16 E. E. Cohen, The Athenian Nation (Princeton, NJ, 2000), 30–48 and 130–92.
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world.17 Admittedly, several references in the ancient texts can be
found, which, when taken at face value, may serve to legitimate the
old orthodoxy.18 Nevertheless, despite the common portrayal of non-
citizen residents in Athens as being outside the Athenian (citizen) com-
munity, tolerated only because of their signiﬁcance for Athens’ superior
economic performance,19 scholars have never been able to ignore totally
the various passages in the sources which give the impression of social
life in Athenian society being characterized by a fairly easy intermin-
gling of persons of divers origin and legal status.20 Recall, for example,
the extraordinary stories of individuals such as Pasion and Phormion,
who, both before and after their naturalization, ‘moved into the highest
social circles and integrated into the Athenian élite’,21 as well as the
curious setting of Plato’s Republic in the house of the elderly metic
Cephalus, following Socrates’ visit to a festival honouring the
Thracian goddess Bendis, whose cult had recently been introduced
into Piraeus. After all, it is remarkable that, rather than stressing a
dichotomy between citizens and non-citizens, Plato describes the
metic hosts, that is to say Cephalus, friend and conﬁdent of Pericles
(Lys. 12.4), and his adult sons Polymarchus, Euthydemus, and the ora-
tor Lysias,22 as ‘friends and nearly kinsmen’ (Resp. 328d6) of their citi-
zen guests, both Athenian aristocrats and more humble members of the
Athenian citizenry.23
Yet how representative are such instances? Might it be possible that
such interactions between citizens and non-citizens were mainly limited
to the social elite? Some scholars have thought so. Whitehead, for
17 For a detailed discussion of The Athenian Nation, see e.g. R. Osborne’s review in CPh 97
(2002), 93–8.
18 See, for example Dem. 22.55, 59.122; Arist. Pol. 1326a18–22.
19 See especially Whitehead (n. 3).
20 See R. K. Sinclair, Democracy and Participation in Athens (Cambridge and New York, 1988),
29; M. H. Hansen and J. A. Crook, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes. Structure,
Principles and Ideology (Oxford, 1991) 87; R. Parker, Athenian Religion. A History (Oxford,
1996), 266–7.
21 For the phrase, see M. I. Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern (London, 1985), 48.
22 Lysias’ family property was worth 70 talents before 404 BCE, which gave him the reputation of
being ‘the richest metic in Athens’ (P.Oxy. XIII, 1606, line 30, 153–5).
23 Among them were, for instance, Charmantides of Paeania (Davies [n. 1], no. 15502); Plato’s
own brothers Euthydemus and Glaucon (Davies [n. 1], no. 8792 X), who were descendants of
Solon, close relatives of the oligarchic leaders Charmides and Critias, and stepsons of the
Periclean democratic eminence Pyrilampes; Nicaretus; the impoverished Socrates; the sophist
Thrasymachus; and Cleitophon son of Aristonymus, who is usually identiﬁed as a supporter of
the oligarchic regime of 411 ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 34).
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instance, concluding his discussion of the consequences of Pericles’
citizenship law of 451/450 on the ideology of the metic, asserted:
we may point to Aspasia, Anaxagoras and the rest; but Perikles (like Plato) may not
have seen any connection between his intellectual foreign guest-friends and the immi-
grant artisans and labourers now congregating in Piraeus and the urban demes, their
presence valued in economic terms but their social mobility in the most obvious
sense now completely blocked.24
In this article, I will re-examine this claim, which denies any scope for
social mobility by the average non-citizen in classical Athens. I will
examine to what extent the peculiar nature of Athenian business life,
now commonly recognized as having been characterized by enduring
cooperation between citizens and non-citizens, provided opportunities
for non-citizens to cross boundaries and ascend the social scale; in
other words, what the repercussions of this peculiar aspect of Athens’
economic system were for the scope of upward social mobility in clas-
sical Athens. I will make a suggestion for an alternative model regarding
social mobility, by arguing that the enduring cooperation between citi-
zens and non-citizens in Athenian business life – the recognition of
which surely weakens the plausibility of a rigid demarcation line having
supposedly physically segregated the various legal status groups – had
important implications for the scope of social mobility in Athenian
society. Most importantly, this cooperation provided opportunities
for non-citizens to create networks across the boundaries of legal status.
These networks could be brought into play in a variety of ways and con-
texts, and hence could plausibly function as important channels for
social circulation.
II
It has already been recognized in modern scholarship that personal
contact between citizens and non-citizens was in the usual course of
events guaranteed by what have been called ‘democratic spaces’ or
‘free spaces’ in classical Athens: public places where citizens would
necessarily have contact not only with one another but also with non-
citizens and even slaves, hence creating common experiences and shap-
ing new forms of identity. Most prominent among the ‘democratic’ or
24 Whitehead (n. 3), 150, and see also 120.
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‘free’ spaces was undoubtedly the Athenian agora,25 the major zone of
personal interaction in Athens. Indeed, as described by the speaker
in Demosthenes’ speech Against Aristogeiton 1 (Dem. 25.51), every sin-
gle Athenian citizen frequented the marketplace on some business,
either public or private. But they were certainly not the only ones.
On the contrary, non-citizens had no less reason for passing time in
the agora. As colourfully described by Millett – in a style matching
the contemporary portrayal by Eubulus26 – the classical agora was,
apart from the prime location in Attica for the business of buying
and selling, also
the setting for administration, publicity, justice, ostracism, imprisonment, religion, pro-
cessions, dancing, athletics and equestrian displays. In addition to persons passing
through, individuals might gather there to get information (ofﬁcial or otherwise), gather
a crowd, gamble, torture a slave, get hired as labourers, bid for contracts, accost a pros-
titute, seek asylum, have a haircut, beg for money or food, fetch water, watch a cock-
ﬁght and ﬁnd out the time.27
This mixing of functions, and, more importantly, the legitimate reason
that it provided for both citizens and non-citizens and people of low sta-
tus to be present in the agora and interact with Athenian citizens, osten-
sibly troubled conservative thinkers. Thus Plato in his Nomoi proposed
moving the political function elsewhere, holding the assemblies in reli-
gious sanctuaries (738d) and electing magistrates in temples (753b).
Aristotle, for his part, advised that, in addition to and separate from
the agora for buying and selling, which he named the ‘necessary market’
(anagkaia agora), the Athenians should lay out a ‘free agora’ (agora
eleuthera), devoted to schole and where no commercial transaction
would take place and no artisan or farmer would be allowed to enter,
unless summoned by the magistrates (Pol. 1331a30–b14).
But the agora was certainly not the only location where citizens and
non-citizens – regardless of their origin, profession, wealth, or inﬂuence –
25 For the agora as respectively a ‘democratic’ or ‘free space’, see P. Millett, ‘Encounters in the
Agora’, in P. Cartledge, P. Millett, and S. von Reden, Kosmos. Essays in Order, Conﬂict and
Community in Classical Athens (Cambridge, 2002), 220; Vlassopoulos (n. 15), 38. For the deep pol-
iticization of Athenian culture as a result of this particular ‘free space’, see Vlassopoulos (n. 15),
45–7.
26 See Eubulus in Ath. 12.640b–c (= Kock ii.190).
27 Millett (n. 25), 215. For a selection of attestations of the merging of businesses in the agora,
see R. E. Wycherley, The Athenian Agora. Results of Excavations Conducted. Vol. 3. Literary and
Epigraphical Testimonia (Princeton, NJ, 1957). See also R. E. Wycherley, ‘The Market of
Athens’, G&R 3.1 (1956), 2–23.
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inevitably and unrestrictedly intermingled with each other. It has, for
instance, not always fully been recognized that at least some sort of
personal interaction between citizens and non-citizens must have taken
placewithin themutual neighbourhood. In spite of prevailing assumptions,
non-citizens were present in signiﬁcant numbers in virtually every deme
throughout Attica, rather than living as an isolated community within one
speciﬁc area.28 Although metics were normally not allowed to buy a
house or a plot of land, they could rent a house, apparently wherever they
wanted. An example is provided by an inscription from 343/342 BC (IG
II2 1590), indicating that, at that time, the house adjacent to the agora of
the deme Cydathenaeon was rented by a metic, while the next houses
were rented by Athenian citizens.29 Within the individual demes, non-
citizens might have generated and expressed unity with neighbouring and
more remote demesmen,30 while numerous citizens might have felt related
to non-citizens living within their own community.
The same might have occurred in social centres such as the Athenian
gymnasia, where both citizens and metics appear to have exercised.31
This can be attested by Plato in Euthydemus (271a–c), and can also
be concluded from a passage in Aeschines’ Against Timarchus
(1.138), in which a law is mentioned forbidding slaves to exercise in
the Athenian gymnasia, as it would have been out of place to permit
supposedly inferior beings, using the words of Roberts, ‘to enjoy the
28 Notwithstanding the fragmentary nature of surviving records, metics are attested in more
than forty separate demes scattered around Attica, including many rural, while fewer than 20 per
cent appear to have lived in the Piraeus: see D. Whitehead, The Demes of Attica, 508/7–ca. 250
B.C. A Political and Social Study (Princeton, NJ, 1986), 82–5; Cohen (n. 16), 122–3, esp.
n. 106. For a detailed account of the demes, see – in addition to Whitehead (this note) – the com-
plementary study by R. Osborne, Demos. The Discovery of Classical Attika (Cambridge, 1985).
29 IG II2 1590.
30 Despite the fact that, throughout the classical period, many Athenian demesmen moved away
from their ancestral demes (A. Damsgaard-Madsen, ‘Attic Funeral Inscriptions: Their Use as
Historical Sources and Some Preliminary Results’, in E. Christiansen, A. Damsgaard-Madsen,
and E. Hallager [eds.], Studies in Ancient History and Numismatics Presented to Rudi Thomsen
[Aarhus, 1988], 55–68; R. Osborne, ‘The Potential Mobility of Human Populations’, OJA 10
[1991], 231–52; C. Taylor, ‘A New Political World’, in R. Osborne [ed.], Debating the Athenian
Cultural Revolution. Art, Literature, and Politics, 430–380 BC [Cambridge, 2007], 84–7; C.
Taylor, ‘Migration and the Demes of Attica’, in C. Holleran and A. Pudsey [eds.], Demography
and the Graeco-Roman World. New Insights and Approaches [Cambridge, 2011], 117–34), the
Athenians who had moved oikos still maintained strong ties with their ancestral demes. See
Cohen (n. 16), 49–78 and 104–29, for an examination of the heterogeneity of the Athenian and
deme community.
31 This is acknowledged by M. H. Hansen, ‘The Polis as an Urban Centre: The Literary and
Epigraphical Evidence’, in M. H. Hansen (ed.), The Polis as an Urban Centre and as a Political
Community (Copenhagen, 1997), 15; and by N. Fisher, ‘Citizens, Foreigners and Slaves in
Greek Society’, in K. H. Kinzl (ed.), ACompanion to the Classical Greek World (Oxford, 2010), 343.
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physical and moral beneﬁts conferred by athletic activity’.32 According
to the speaker, the lawgivers did not go on to command that ‘the free
man shall anoint himself and take exercise’, as they, seeing the good
that comes from gymnastics, thought that, in prohibiting the slaves,
they were, by the same words, inviting ‘the free’. The speaker does
not make any distinction between citizens and non-citizens, nor does
he mention any special regulation for metics or xenoi (‘foreigners’).
This suggests that both citizens and non-citizens were allowed to use
the Athenian gymnasia, where they could interact with each other in a
way which is illustrated by the encounter between Socrates and the
Chian brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in the Lyceum, as
described in Plato’s Euthydemus.33
The same applies to the Athenian cemeteries, where gravestones of
citizens and metics stood together indiscriminately. Against the views
of Morris that formal burial was a privilege indicating and dependent
upon citizenship, and that ‘classical Athenians put great emphasis on
formal, bounded cemeteries as symbols of membership of the citizen
body as a whole’,34 voices have been raised to deny both the reality of
burial as a citizen privilege and the existence of exclusive citizen ceme-
teries at Athens.35 As a consequence, citizens and non-citizens can be
supposed to have mourned their loved ones side by side, which pro-
vided the latter with an extra opportunity to mingle with certain mem-
bers of the Athenian citizenry and thus create for themselves
opportunities for social enhancement.
Citizens and non-citizens might also have associated during a shared
participation in socio-cultural and religious activities of the polis or the
individual demes. In an analogous way to their access to the central
Panathenaic ritual, the procession at the City Dionysia, the Lenaia,
the Hephaisteia, and the Eleusian Mysteries, metics are, for instance,
known to have visited deme religious shrines and to have participated
32 J. W. Roberts, City of Sokrates. An Introduction to Classical Athens (London, 1998), 27.
33 The assertion in W. Miller, Greece and the Greeks. A Survey of Greek Civilization (New York,
1941), 133, that the Cynosarges, one of the three gymnasia in Athens, was reserved for nothoi
(those of illegitimate birth) and metics, thus suggesting that metics were not allowed in other gym-
nasia, is based on no evidence at all. On the contrary, not only do foreigners appear to have visited
other gymnasia, but well-born Athenians are also known to have visited the Cynosarges (And. 1.61;
Ps.-Plut. Ax. 364a).
34 I. Morris, Burial and Ancient Society. The Rise of the Greek City-state (Cambridge, 1987) 54; I.
Morris, ‘The Archaeology of Ancestors: The Saxe-Goldstein Hypothesis Revisited’, CArchJ 1
(1991), 157–8.
35 C. Patterson, ‘“Citizen Cemeteries” in Classical Athens?’, CQ 56.1 (2006), 48–56.
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along with Athenian citizens in the worship of local deities. Moreover,
citizens participated in alien cults that had been imported along with
and for the sake of foreign non-citizens, as the participation of
Socrates in the celebration of the newly introduced Bendis, described
above, demonstrates.36
All this demonstrates that non-citizens resident in Attica were any-
thing but socially isolated from the Athenian citizenry, and that in
many circumstances they had occasions to intermingle with Athenian
citizens. Of course, although this intermingling might have diluted
the rigid demarcation line which supposedly physically segregated the
various legal status groups, it may not have been sufﬁcient to ensure
the creation of weak ties between citizens and non-citizens, which
could be used as a social resource by non-citizens attempting to
improve their status in Athenian society. Such relationships, however,
can reasonably be supposed to have been created in those settings
where citizens were most inclined to build long-lasting relationships
with non-citizens, as their mutual achievements depended on it – set-
tings such as Athenian business life.
III
Around 345 BC, a certain Euxitheus appeared before an Athenian court
to appeal against the decision of his deme Halimous, taken during a
re-examination or diapsephisis, to remove him from the ofﬁcial deme
register (Dem. 57). Euxitheus asserted that he met the requirements
for Athenian citizenship, being descended from both an Athenian
father and an Athenian mother. He claimed that the man allegedly
responsible for his expulsion, Eubulides, acted out of personal enmity,
having no real evidence against him except for some unconvincing and
dishonourable indications, such as his father’s foreign accent and his
mother’s humble employment, selling ribbons and working as a
wet-nurse. By doing so, Eubulides had allegedly slandered him, in
36 The participation of metics in Athenian polis religion has recently been scrutinized by
S. Wijma, ‘Joining the Athenian Community: The Participation of Metics in Athenian Polis
Religion in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.’ (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of
Utrecht, 2010). In this excellent study, Wijma has demonstrated that, both at polis and at deme
level, the Athenians tried to incorporate metics into the citizen or deme community by having
them share in the polis or deme rites, while articulating their position in that community by having
them participate in a speciﬁc way.
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violation of a nomos stating that people who insulted a male or female
citizen about his or her work in the agora were liable to a charge of slan-
der.37 The nomos mentioned by Euxitheus (Dem. 57.30) not only sug-
gests that slander based upon occupation had at one time been
common enough to become a source of concern for lawmakers, but
also denotes the reality of citizens ‘working in the agora’ in classical
Athens.
For quite a long time, scholars have supported Hasebroek’s claim,
following the insights of Bücher and Weber,38 of a deep-rooted eco-
nomic dichotomy in classical Athenian society between a citizenry
mainly living on income generated from landed property and occasion-
ally providing bottomry loans to shipping merchants, while in every
other respect leading the life of landowners, and a group of non-citizen
residents, largely operating in trade and manufacturing.39 This picture
can no longer be maintained, as various studies have shown that, espe-
cially in the fourth century, numerous Athenians pursued commercial
activities.40 In fact, men such as Apollodorus, son of the former slave
and naturalized citizen Pasion, who did everything to distance himself
from the metic community he originated from by proﬁling himself as a
landowner in order to assert his citizenship,41 can reasonably be consid-
ered as rather anachronistic ﬁgures. After all, as demonstrated by
37 In Athenian law, the truth of an allegation was not a sufﬁcient defence. See Todd (n. 10),
260.
38 K. Bücher, A. Hansay, and H. Pirenne, Études d’histoire et d’économie politique (Brussels,
1901), ;249–84; M. Weber, ‘Die Stadt’, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft 47 (1921), 756; M. Weber,
Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum (Tübingen, 1924), 32–3.
39 J. Hasebroek, Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece (New York, 1978), 22, 28, and 35.
40 P. Millett, ‘Maritime Loans and the Structure of Credit in Fourth-century Athens’, in P.
Garnsey, K. Hopkins, and C. R. Whittaker (eds.), Trade in the Ancient Economy (Berkeley, CA,
1983), 38; C. Mossé, ‘The “World of the Emporium” in the Private Speeches of
Demosthenes’, in ibid., 53–63; M. V. Hansen, ‘Athenian Maritime Trade in the 4th Century
B.C.: Operation and Finance’, C&M 35 (1984), 88 and 92 n. 74; also Oertel’s much earlier criti-
cism in his review of Hasebroek (n. 39), Deutsche Literaturzeitung 49 (1928), 1624–5 In fourth-
century Athens in particular, numerous Athenians were self-employed in manufacturing and
trade: see V. Ehrenberg, The People of Aristophanes. A Sociology of Old Attic Comedy (Oxford,
1943), 162; R. J. Hopper, Trade and Industry in Classical Greece (London, 1979), 140; M. I.
Finley, Economy and Society in Ancient Greece, ed. R. P. Saller and B. D. Shaw (London, 1981),
99; Davies (n. 7), 38–72; R. Osborne, ‘The Economics and Politics of Slavery at Athens’, in A.
Powell (ed.), The Greek World (London, 1995), 30; C. M. Reed, Maritime Traders in the Ancient
Greek World (Cambridge, 2003), 27–33. For a contemporary attestation of Athenian citizens exer-
cising trade, see Xen. Mem. 3.73.6. Many others were professionally engaged in entrepreneurial
activities: see P. Garnsey, Non-slave Labour in the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge, 1980);
Davies (n. 7), 38–72; W. E. Thompson, ‘The Athenian Entrepreneur’, AC 51 (1983), 53–85.
41 Apollodorus moved from Piraeus to the countryside after his father’s death (Dem. 53.4) and
seems to have embraced the rather extravagant lifestyle and ideology of the long-standing landed
Athenian elite (Dem. 36.8, 45). See Trevett (n. 1), 164–79; Deene (n. 3), 169–74, for discussion.
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Davies, in the fourth century it became increasingly normal for citizens
to have a mixed holding, consisting of real property in land and houses,
manufacturing property in the form of revenue-earning slaves, and
liquid investments.42 Nevertheless, some scholars persisted in maintain-
ing that citizens and non-citizens practiced their profession in separate
areas: that is to say, for instance, that trade by non-citizens was concen-
trated in the harbour of Piraeus, while market exchange in the agora in
Athens was protected against foreign merchants and dominated by citi-
zens. This opinion, however, has lost all support, and it is now com-
monly believed that citizens and non-citizens closely cooperated in
commercial activities.43
This reality unmistakably worried contemporary critics with preju-
dices against trade and commerce. In Aristotle’s sociology of the polis,
for instance, the residents obtaining their income through ‘working
in the agora’ ideally form a distinct ‘illiberal’ group (Pol. 1291b14–30;
1289b26–34). In what he terms the best constituted (namely,
oligarchic) poleis, those pursuing the ‘market life’ (agoraios bios) would
not be citizens (1328b34), while those democracies admitting ‘market
people’ (agoraioi anthropoi) are considered as substandard. Regarded as
more acceptable are the Thebans, who had a law which barred from
ofﬁce anyone who had been actively engaged in the agora in the preced-
ing ten years (1278a25; cf. [Rh. Al.] 1424a25–31).44 One might at ﬁrst
sight suspect Aristotle’s disapproval of citizens ‘working in the agora’
to be caused merely by the fact that those activities were incompatible
with the notorious nostalgic idea of the self-sufﬁcient oikos. However,
the nature of Plato’s insistence on the minimalization of commercial
interaction between citizens and non-citizens, by letting them deal
with non-citizens through slaves or other non-citizen mediators and
then only on pre-set days in each month (Leg. 925b), indicates an
anxiety about the mingling of diverse sorts of people who allegedly
42 Davies (n. 7), 37–8. The mixed holdings of Apollodorus’ own father, Pasion, of Arizelus of
Sphettus (Aeschin. 1.97–101), of Ciron (Davies [n. 1], no. 8443), and of Euctemon of Cephisia
(ibid., no. 15164) appear to have been standard for the fourth-century propertied class, while those
of men such as Demosthenes the elder (ibid., no. 3597.XIII) and of Diodotus (ibid., no. 3885)
were probably exceptional.
43 See S. von Reden, ‘The Piraeus: A World Apart’, G&R 42.1 (1995), 24–37, for discussion.
44 Aristotle’s disapproval of the so-called ‘market mob’ (agoraios ochlos), allegedly based on the
grounds that their low-status lifestyle does not encourage proper virtues (Pol. 1328b40), reverbe-
rates in several texts written by and for the Athenian elite, assuming that men operating outside the
norms of philia relationships were inclined towards deceit (e.g. Pl. Resp. 289e and 371c; Prt. 347c;
Xen. Cyr. 1.2.3; Mem. 3.7.5). See Millett (n. 25), 218–19.
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ought to be kept apart. Indeed, Plato might possibly have recognized
that this mingling, obviously an unavoidable consequence of not only
the joint work of but also the cooperation between citizens and non-
citizens in commercial activities, undoubtedly had profound effects
on the supposed demarcation lines between the various legal status
groups in Athenian society. After all, it was in Athenian business life,
more than in any other context,45 that Athenian citizens were probably
most inclined to build sustainable – and, more importantly, beneﬁcial –
relationships with non-citizens, as the success of their business
depended on it. The development of sustainable boundary-crossing
networks connecting citizens with non-citizens in cooperative environ-
ments provided opportunities for and access to shared experience and
common interests and advantages, which plausibly might have served,
inter alia, as instruments by which both legal status groups were per-
suaded to make more cooperative choices than they would have done
in a so-called game-theoretic ‘state of nature’.
The denser the network, the more likely that both citizens and non-
citizens would have cooperated for mutual beneﬁt, even in the face of
persistent problems of collective action, such as the so-called ‘tragedy
of the commons’, ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, and so forth.46 Additionally,
the constructed ties would have been an important instrument for
organization and interaction, and would have functioned as channels
through which information about the honesty and reliability of both
citizen and non-citizen could be veriﬁed.47 Moreover, they would
have supported prevailing norms of reciprocity by creating expectations
that favours would be returned and by increasing for those who
behaved opportunistically the potential danger that they would not
share in the beneﬁts of future transactions. All these mechanisms
would automatically have reduced transaction costs, most comprehen-
sively described by North as ‘the costs of measuring the valuable
45 An exception is without any doubt the Athenian army. For the participation by metics in the
Athenian armed forces, see Whitehead (n. 3), 83–6; Cohen (n. 16), 73–4; Adak (n. 15), 67–72;
D. T. Engen, Honor and Proﬁt. Athenian Trade Policy and the Economy and Society of Greece,
415–307 B.C.E. (Ann Arbor, MI, 2010), 197–202.
46 For ‘the tragedy of the commons’ as a sociological concept, see G. Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of
the Commons’, Science 162 (1986), 1243–8. The ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ as a fundamental problem
in game theory was originally framed by Flood and Dresher in 1950. Tucker formalized the game
with prison sentence payoffs and named it the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ (see W. Poundstone, Prisoner’s
Dilemma [New York, 1993], for discussion).
47 For the use of social networks for collecting information among Athenian citizens, see J.
Ober, Democracy and Knowledge. Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens (Princeton, NJ,
2008), 118–67.
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attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights
and policing and enforcing agreements’,48 and thus enhanced not only
the individual’s business performance but also Athenian efﬁciency and
productivity.
Athens’ superior economic performance during this period has
recently – in the light of the currently prevalent ‘transaction cost eco-
nomics’ – been credited to the fact that the Athenians were particularly
successful in developing institutions that fostered exchange and
reduced transaction costs.49 Ancient historians working with the con-
cept ‘transaction costs’ have (presumably with the proposals in
Xenophon’s Poroi in mind) mainly focused on the most apparent ele-
ments in the transaction cost/productivity equation, such as monetary
systems and laws which sought to improve the economic climate for
foreign tradesmen and entrepreneurs in Athens.50 As important as
these innovations may have been, the practical need of sustainable
boundary-crossing networks in Athenian business life cannot be over-
looked.51 It is hard to believe that Athens’ economic performance
would have been as high-class as it is known to have been without
the necessary social networks between the most important parties
involved.52
48 D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York, 1991),
27.
49 See e.g. W. Scheidel, I. Morris, and R. P. Saller (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of the
Greco-Roman World (Cambridge, 2007), 374–5; Ober (n. 47), 17, 23–4. The concept of ‘transac-
tion costs’ is most comprehensively described by North (n. 48), 27, as ‘the costs of measuring the
valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and
enforcing agreements’. For transaction-cost economics, see O. E. Williamson, ‘The Economics of
Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach’, American Journal of Sociology 87 (1981), 548–77;
R. H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law (Chicago, IL, 1988); Y. Benkler, The Wealth of
Networks. How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom (New Haven, CT, 2006), 106–16.
50 For transaction costs and ancient law, see B. Frier and D. P. Kehoe, ‘Law and Economic
Institutions’, in Scheidel, Morris, and Saller (n. 49), 113–43.
51 As early as 1985, M. Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness’, American Journal of Sociology 91.3 (1985), 481–510, condemned ‘new institution-
al economics’ because of its failure to acknowledge the importance of solid personal relations and
networks of relations – what he called ‘embeddedness’ – in generating trust, in establishing expec-
tations, and in creating and enforcing norms.
52 It is known that the Athenians were remarkably prosperous on a per capita basis, and much
wealthier than they had formerly been: I. Morris, ‘Economic Growth in Ancient Greece’, Journal of
the Institute of Theoretical Economics 160.4 (2004), 709–42; I. Morris, ‘Archaeology, Standards of
Living, and Greek Economic History’, in J. G. Manning and I. Morris (eds.), The Ancient
Economy. Evidence and Models (Stanford, CA, 2005), 91–126; G. Kron, ‘Anthropometry,
Physical Anthropology, and the Reconstruction of Ancient Health, Nutrition, and Living
Standards’, Historia 54 (2005), 68–83; S. von Reden, ‘Consumption’, in Scheidel, Morris, and
Saller (n. 49), table 15.1. By the 330s, Athenian revenues appear to have been equal to or higher
than what they had been in the 430s, at the height of the empire (for Athenian fourth-century
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Considering the importance of reducing transaction costs (such as
information searching, negotiation, and monitoring and enforcing
transactions) for the facilitation of transactions in Athenian business
life, and consequently for the enhancement of Athenian trade, it is
highly unlikely that this business life was deﬁcient in intensive
boundary-crossing social networks between citizens and non-citizens.
In order to achieve and sustain such a level of economic performance,
citizens and non-citizens cooperating in Athenian business life needed
to be brought into association with each other and to come to function
as a single, extended network. In some instances, the long-standing
connections between citizens and non-citizens might have evolved
into a more formalized form of association, employable for economic
purposes. An illustration of such an association is a relief of the mid-
fourth century dedicated to the nymphs and all the gods, by what
appears to have been a professional association of fullers (Berlin SK
709). The names of the dedicators attested in the inscription point to
a fraternity between citizens and non-citizens, both male and female,
who were drawn together by means of shared occupational interests.53
The available material is perhaps a little too scanty to make real conclu-
sions about the frequency and functions of such associations,54 but it is
prosperity and its relationship to overseas trade, see E. M. Burke, ‘Lycurgan Finances’, GRBS 26
[1985], 251–6; E. M. Burke, ‘The Economy of Athens in the Classical Era: Some Adjustments to
the Primitivist Model’, TAPhS 122 [1992], 199–226). Moreover, the polis again actively ﬁnanced
building projects and provided welfare beneﬁts for its citizens (Ober [n. 47], 65–6, 254–58), while
the earnings of both skilled and unskilled labourers were remarkably high when compared to other
pre-industrial societies (W. Scheidel, ‘Real Wages in Early Economies: Evidence for Living
Standards from 1800 BCE to 1300 CE’, JESHO 53.3 [2010], 425–62).
53 IG II² 2934: οἱ πλυνῆς : Νύμwαις : εὐξάμενοι : ἀνέθεσαν : καὶ θεοῖς πᾶσιν Ζωαγόρας : <Ζ>
ωκύπρου : Ζώκυπρος : Ζωαγόρου : Θάλλος : Λεύκη Σωκράτης Πολυκράτους : Ἀπολλοwάνης :
Εὐπορίωνος : Σωσίστρατος Μάνης : Μυρρίνη : Σωσίας : Σωσιγένης : Μίδας (‘To the nymphs and
all the gods, fulﬁlling a vow, the fullers set up this tablet: Zoagoras the son of Zokypros,
Zokypros the son of Zoagoras, Thallos, Leuke, Sokrates son of Polykrates, Apollophanes, the
son of Euporion, Sosistratos, Manes, Myrrhine, Sosias, Sosigenes, Midas’). See K.
Vlassopoulos, ‘Two Images of Ancient Slavery: The “Living Tool” and the Koinônia’, in E.
Herrmann-Otto (ed.), Sklaverei und Zwangsarbeit zwischen Akzeptanz und Widerstand
(Hildesheim, 2011), 467–8, for discussion.
54 Although all of these associations had some connection to cult worship, M. Leiwo, ‘Religion,
or Other Reasons? Private Associations in Athens’, in J. Frösén (ed.), Early Hellenistic Athens.
Symptoms of Change (Helsinki, 1997), 103–18, considers their main purpose to have been not reli-
gion but synousia, with common meals, and social and ﬁnancial support. According to him, the
connection to a cult was necessitated by the lack of any (legal) model for other kinds of associa-
tions. Others scholars persist in believing that the religious meaning of these associations must
have been primary, while other aims, such as economic or social support, were of minor import-
ance: see J. Vondeling, Eranos (Groningen, 1961), 261; Millett (n. 7), 151. Nevertheless, even if
their primary purpose was not necessarily economic in nature, membership of these religious
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hard not to see such groupings, which appear in our sources towards
the end of the fourth century, as forerunners of the professional associa-
tions that we encounter in the Hellenistic and Roman period.
One might wonder whether the Athenians acknowledged the import-
ance of those boundary-crossing networks for both their own individual
businesses and Athens’ economic performance. They were, of course,
familiar with the fact that making use of long-standing networks for
the circulation of goods decreased the danger of deceit, excessive valu-
ing, or violence. By tradition, they had made use of reciprocity or
mutual exchange between (usually socially equal) philoi.55 Moreover,
contemporary thinkers unquestionably acknowledged the pragmatic
value of association. Aristotle, for instance, believed that most of the
koinoniai which the polis encompassed were founded for the advantage
of its members (Eth. Nic. 1160a4–6).56 This makes it plausible to
assume that the Athenians might have been truly aware of the advan-
tage of associating with those non-citizens actively involved in their
business life, and that they strategically accepted the existence of
boundary-crossing networks in their society, thus pragmatically being
more liberal and inclusivist than has been taken as read in the past.
As important as society is in determining individual economic action,
I believe, with Granovetter but contrary to Sahlins,57 in the existence
of a conceptual middle ground between the often non-pragmatic cul-
tural basis of social structures, as described in the works of Athenian
theorists such as Plato and Aristotle, and in the reality of individuals
associations which cut across economic strata and class boundaries might still have been econom-
ically fruitful.
55 See A. W. H. Adkins, ‘Friendship and Self-sufﬁciency in Homer and Aristotle’, CQ 13
(1963), 30–45; G. Herman, Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City (Cambridge, 1987); Millett
(n. 7), 109–26; D. Konstan, ‘Greek Friendship’, AJPh 117 (1996), 71–94; D. Konstan,
Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge, 1997), 1–92; P. Mitchell, ‘Philia, Eunoia and the
Greek Interstate Relations’, Antichthon 31 (1997), 28–44; D. Konstan, ‘Reciprocity and
Friendship’, in C. Gill, N. Postlewaite, and R. Seaford (eds.), Reciprocity in Ancient Greece
(Oxford, 1998), 279–301, for discussion.
56 Aristotle considered the Greek polis to be both a community or association (koinonia) and a
network of interconnecting koinoniai. For an analysis of the Greek city in view of the Aristotelian
concept of koinonia, see O. Murray, ‘Polis and Politeia in Aristotle’, in M. H. Hansen (ed.), The
Ancient Greek City-state (Copenhagen, 1993), 197–210; J. Ober, ‘The Polis as a Society:
Aristotle, John Rawls and the Athenian Social Contract’, in ibid.), 129–60; K. Vlassopoulos,
‘Beyond and Below the Polis: Networks, Associations, and the Writing of Greek History’, MHR
22.1 (2007), 11–22.
57 Granovetter (n. 51), 485–7; M. Granovetter and R. Swedberg, The Sociology of Economic Life
(Oxford, 1992), 12; M. D. Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago, IL, 1976), 55–6.
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acting contrary to such structures for practical needs, thus having a cru-
cial role in moulding society in keeping with these practical needs.
IV
The business, social, and associative connections between the various
legal status groups active in Athenian business life automatically created
opportunities for social capital accumulation, and thus had important
effects on the scope of social mobility for non-citizens. On the broadest
level, they might have had important effects on the scope of social
mobility for the total group of non-citizens in Athenian society. After
all, the net of constructed weak-tie bridges between the existing strong-
tie networks of citizens on the one hand and non-citizens on the other is
very likely to have resulted in a comprehensive intermingling of the
members of both legal status groups,58 producing opportunities to cre-
ate and assert social status, and providing a channel through which
movement between or access to the different positions of unequal
advantage might have been possible.59
Moreover, while the social capital accumulating from the weak-tie
bridges between citizens and non-citizens beneﬁted the community
of non-citizen Athenian residents as a whole, the bridge-builders them-
selves – namely the non-citizen artisans, traders, and businessmen for-
ging contacts and friendships with their citizen colleagues – might have
done especially well. First, precisely because of their ability to bring
together otherwise less well-connected contacts and because of the
prestige which their citizen contacts as social assets conveyed, they
were liable to become increasingly well-respected members of the
58 For a detailed discussion of the implications of this kind of intermingling in Athenian society,
see M. Deene, Aspects of Social Mobility in Classical Athens (Ghent, 2013), 221–52.
59 An impression of the kind of intermingling which this state of affairs may have resulted in,
might most vividly be obtained when considering the deme Rhamnous, where the arguably excep-
tional circumstances, particularly well attested for the latter half of the third century, present a vivid
picture of the mingling of highly different individuals, which, as acknowledged by R. Osborne,
‘must have been an invariable characteristic of life in classical and Hellenistic Athens’. In
Rhamnous, the continuously changing population seems to have formed groups and taken corpor-
ate actions easily, despite being unclassiﬁable in terms of conventional legal or social categories.
While connecting in order to cooperate, residents at Rhamnous openly disregarded both the for-
mal and informal divisions within Athenian society, such as divisions of legal status (most import-
antly between citizen and non-citizen), wealth, occupation, etc. See R. Osborne, ‘The Demos and
its Divisions in Classical Athens’, in O. Murray and S. R. F. Price (eds.), The Greek City. From
Homer to Alexander (Oxford, 1990), 284–5, for discussion.
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non-citizen community and more attractive to other high-proﬁle non-
citizens as a contact in their own networks, resulting in turn in further
networking reinforcement as well as a higher social position within the
non-citizen community.
Secondly, and presumably more importantly, functioning as a broker
within the extensive social network of weak and strong ties constituting
Athenian society, they are above all to be expected to have managed to
acquire vital social capital, through their building of bridges to citi-
zens,60 and thus to have been capable of bringing this social capital
into play for personal enhancement on the social scale. Positioned at
a crossroads of social organization and having more diverse contacts,
the so-called bridge-builders were most of all likely to be candidates
discussed for inclusion in new opportunities and consequently able to
transfer their social capital assets to other kinds of assets crucial for
achieving a rise in status.
One example of this is the way in which social connections to citizens
might have been not only useful but also essential for those non-citizens
attempting to obtain Athenian timai, ranging from mere honours
through functional privileges even to full Athenian citizenship.61
Although metics considering themselves to be worthy of honours in
return for their services towards the Athenian demos could pass a
60 For the assertion that in a networked structure, the holes between solidly linked sub-networks
are points of entrepreneurial opportunity because the individuals who bridge those holes gain
social capital, see R. S. Burt, Structural Holes. The Social Structure of Competition (Cambridge,
MA, and London, 1992); R. S. Burt, ‘The Contingent Value of Social Capital’, Administrative
Science Quarterly 42 (1997), 355–73; R. S. Burt, Brokerage and Closure. An Introduction to Social
Capital (Oxford, 2005), 10–57.
61 The amount of information that we have concerning the granting of timai to both citizen and
non-citizens is relatively abundant. Decisions of honour-granting institutions, such as the council
or the assembly, phylai, demes, and other associations, to honour certain individuals for their ser-
vices towards the state can be traced down in honorary decrees, private dedications established by
former honorands, and literary texts. For collections of ﬁfth- and fourth-century honorary decrees,
see A. S. Henry, Honours and Privileges in Athenian Decrees. The Principal Formulae of Athenian
Honorary Decrees (Hildesheim and New York, 1983); C. Veligianni-Terzi, Wertbegriffe in den
attischen Ehrendekreten der klassischen Zeit (Stuttgart, 1997), 14–151; S. D. Lambert, ‘Athenian
State Laws and Decrees 352/1–322/1: I. Decrees Honouring Athenians’, ZPE 150 (2004), 85–
112; S. D. Lambert, ‘Athenian State Laws and Decrees, 352/1–322/1: III. Decrees Honouring
Foreigners. A. Citizenship, Proxeny and Euergesy’, ZPE 158 (2006), 115–58; S. D. Lambert,
‘Athenian State Laws and Decrees, 352/1–322/1: III. Decrees Honouring Foreigners. B. Other
Awards’, ZPE 159 (2007), 101–54; S. D. Lambert, Inscribed Athenian Laws and Decrees 352/1–
322/1 BC (Leiden, 2012). For an overview of the private dedications recording grants of honours
and privileges, see Veligianni-Terzi (this note), 152–62. For recent discussions of the granting
of timai to non-citizens (including metics), see in particular Adak (n. 15); Engen (n. 45);
Deene (n. 58), 144–62.
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written request (aitesis) to the boule (council of citizens),62 their interests
had to be defended by citizens. After all, in normal circumstances non-
citizens had no access to the honouring institutions,63 unless granted
the right of prosodos (privileged entry).64 There is some scant evidence
which has caused some scholars to believe that foreigners were allowed
to appear in the boule or ekklesia (principal assembly) to state their
case.65 If so, this might only have happened through the mediation
of an Athenian citizen, who (as he is known to have done in their
absence) spoke for them and recommended them to these institu-
tions.66 It is possible that some metics relied on the support of their
own prostates (sponsor) for this, but as the relationship between a
metic and his prostates appears to have developed ‘from a strict original
requirement to a virtual dead letter’ by the fourth century, it is very
likely that many of them will have had to bring into play their most
inﬂuential citizen contacts, just as the other foreigners did.67
This is only one of the many situations in which non-citizens’ contacts
with Athenian citizens, and the social capital which these contacts
entailed, could be used in order to acquire other forms of capital that
were crucial for social advancement. Of course, the nature and intensity
of the weak-tie contacts established in Athenian business life might have
affected the extent to which these contacts were fruitful for non-citizens
62 P. Gauthier, Les Cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs (Athens and Paris, 1985), 83 ff. and 184 ff.;
R. Zelnick-Abramowitz, ‘Supplication and Request: Application by Foreigners to the Athenian
Polis’, Mnemosyne 51.5 (1998), 554–73; Adak (n. 15), 196–7. The only honour which could not
be requested was the grant of citizenship: see Osborne (n. 2), iv.147.
63 According to Zelnick-Abramowitz (n. 62), 557, ofﬁcial requests differed from private
requests in that ofﬁcial emissaries according to the customary law had access to the boule and to
the ekklesia.
64 For grants of prosodos, see IG I³ 28.16–18 (450–440); I³ 55.18 (c. 431); I³ 70.9–11 (c. 430–
420); I³ 159.20–7 (c. 430); I³ 65.17–20 (c. 427/426); I³ 73 (424/3); I³ 101 I.37–9 (410/409); II²
1.72–3 (403/402); II² 145 I.4–5 (403/402); SEG 14.36.6–7 (c. 400); IG II² 86 (early fourth cen-
tury); II² 24b.10–12 (c. 387/386?); Pecirka 29/31.9–13 (c. 380–370); IG II² 74 (ante 378/377); II²
180.10–15 (c. 375–350); II² 103 (369/368); II² 107 (368/367); II² 151 (ante 353/352); II² 185
(ante 353/352); II² 660 I.13–15 (c. 350–300?); II² 579.8–12 (c. 350–300?); II² 1186 (mid-fourth
century); II² 226.14–17 (c. 343/342); II² 238.b (338/337); II² 426 (336–334); SEG 19.119.15–
20 (c. 334–330); Hesp. 29.81–157 + IG II2 564 (c. 329–322); IG II² 549 + 306 (323/322?); II²
448 II (323/322); II² 456b.19 (307/306); II² 505 (302/301); II² 571 (late fourth century).
65 See IG II² 109, line 9 (363/362); II² 226, lines 34–5 (342); II² 408, lines 6–8 (ante 330).
66 Zelnick-Abramowitz (n. 62), 555–62; Gauthier (n. 62), 181 f. Gauthier believes that, since
some of the inscriptions do not refer to the involvement of citizens, foreigners could also appear
on their own in the boule or ekklesia in order to submit or defend their requests (ibid., 183 f.,
187 f.). See also the criticism by R. Zelnick-Abramowitz, Not Wholly Free. The Concept of
Manumission and the Status of Manumitted Slaves in the Ancient Greek World (Leiden, 2005), 560.
67 For the citation, see Whitehead (n. 3), 90. On connections between Athenian politicians and
foreigners and on the motives for moving proxeny decrees, see S. Perlman, ‘ANote on the Political
Implications of Proxenia in the Fourth Century B.C.’, CQ 8 (1958), 185–91.
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seeking social advance. Presumably the most fruitful were multiplex rela-
tionships, linking citizens and non-citizens in more than one context,
allowing the resources of one relationship to be appropriated for use in
others, such as the possibility of calling upon a person who had obliga-
tions in one context for aid when having problems or needs in another
context.68 The fact that banking, for instance, was, more than any other
business sector, so intensely personalized that business and social rela-
tions were inclined to coalesce,69 might have automatically provided
bankers with an extensive and intensive social network of often inﬂuential
Athenian citizens as social backing.70 In addition, those relations which
were endorsed in a more or less formalized association might have con-
tained a more coercive power and thus a greater assurance of the transfer-
ability of the social capital assets obtained within these associations. After
all, a member of an association would have been expected to do every-
thing possible to help any member of the same group – whatever their
socio-economic or legal status – in their capacity as members of that
group. Examples of this characteristic of Athenian associations are far
from few, but [Lysias] 8 undoubtedly provides the most vivid account
of what might – and above all what might not – have been expected
from fellow-members of an association (sunousia).71
68 For multiplex relationships, see J. Coleman, ‘Social Capital in the Creation of Human
Capital’, American Journal of Sociology 94 Suppl. (1988), 95–120. The fact that membership to
an association cut across both economic strata and legal stratus groups has led some scholars to
consider corporate entities and associations as being characterized by clientelistic relationships:
see T. W. Gallant, Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece. Reconstructing the Rural Domestic Economy
(Cambridge, 1991), 143–69; I. Arnaoutoglou, ‘Associations and Patronage in Ancient Athens’,
AncSoc 25 (1994), 5–17. However, the fact that the business success of Athenian citizens’
depended on the cooperative attitude of and sustainable corporate networks with their non-citizen
colleagues refutes the assumption that all of these relationships between citizens and non-citizens
were automatically of asymmetrical nature.
69 Cohen (n. 15), 65–6.
70 This may be one of the explanations behind the observation that, although bankers were not
the only businessmen who successfully used their gains in order to obtain Athenian citizenship
(e.g. the salt-ﬁsh seller Chaerephilus: see Davies [n. 1], no. 15128), they above all appear – if
one is allowed to make any conclusion concerning the matter from the scant amount of evidence
– to have been likely to be candidates for this rarest and most valuable of all timai that could be
conferred upon non-citizens. See, for instance, the lives of Pasion (ibid., no. 11672; Osborne
[n. 2], T30), Pasion’s ex-slave Phormion (Davies [n. 1], no. 11675.IX; Osborne [n. 2], T48),
Conon (Osborne [n. 2], T81), and Epigenes (ibid., T80). Additionally, it has been presumed
that the trierarch Aristolochus of Erchia was the same man as the banker Aristolochus of Dem.
45.63 (Davies [n. 1], no. 1946), and that the victorious choregos Timodemus is to be identiﬁed
with the banker Timodemus of Dem. 36.29, 50 (ibid., no. 13674). See also Davies (n. 7), 65–
6; Cohen (n. 15), 88–9; Osborne (n. 2), iv.196.
71 [Lys.] 8 was presumably never intended for a law court, but may have been composed to
address the members of the association of which the speaker (i.e. possibly Lysias himself) was a
member.
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VIn conclusion, it can deﬁnitely be suggested that the peculiar nature of
Athenian business life, characterized by the joint work of and cooper-
ation between citizens and non-citizens, had a signiﬁcant impact on
the scope of social mobility in Athenian society. This joint work and
cooperation provided opportunities for non-citizens in creating net-
works across the boundaries of legal status, networks that could be
brought into play in a variety of ways and contexts, and hence could
plausibly function as important channels for social circulation.
Consciously crossing the boundaries of legal- and politico-centric
history, this model exposes an important social mechanism, through
which (inter alia) a reasonable case can be made for the existence of
social advancement of non-citizens in classical Athens. Needless to
say, it would be fascinating to take this conclusion a step further, by
mapping the various networks to which non-citizens belonged, and
by examining to what extent they actually managed to make use of
these channels in order to enhance their social status. That, however,
is clearly beyond the scope of this article, and hence remains as an
important question for future research.
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